LESS than a month before Bismarck's dismissal as German chancellor, the Reichstag elections of February I890 destroyed the parliamentary majority of the Kartell parties -National Liberals and Conservativeswith whose support he had governed. The number of Reichstag seats held by these parties fell from 22I to I40, out of the total of397; they never again achieved more than I69. To the multitude of problems left by Bismarck to his successors was therefore added one of parliamentary arithmetic: how was the chancellor to organize a Reichstag majority when the traditional governmental parties by themselves were no longer large enough, and the intransigently anti-governmental SPD was constantly increasing its representation? It was in this situation that the role of the Centre party in Wilhelmine politics became decisive, for between I890 and I9I4 the party possessed a quarter of the seats in the Reichstag, and thus held the balance of power between Left and Right.
policies supporting the rights of the individual states within the Reichl, the democratic franchise, the demand for more local self-government and social reforms. A number of Catholic deputies in fact refused to join the new party, while a number of Protestants, of whom the most noteworthy was Ludwig von Gerlach, did so.9 The tacit sympathy of many Protestant Conservatives was aroused by the severity of Liberal attacks on the Catholic Church during the Kulturkampf, and this fund of sympathy was frequently drawn on in subsequent years. In 1907, when Biilow tried to resurrect the Kartell alliance against Centre and SPD Reichsfeinde by enlisting the support of the Progressives as a gcovernmental party, -the Conservative Kretizzeittung came out openly against attacking its ' natural allies ' in the Centre,10 and local electoral agreements were concluded between the two which cut across the divisions of the Billow block."1 This Conservative sympathy was reciprocated. Windthorst's own aim was always the establishment of a ' Christian Conservative party ', and after his death in i8gi the need to break out of the confessional ghetto was even more openly acknowledged by influential groups within the party, especially those gathered around Julius Bachem in Cologne, and the Social Catholics of the Mdnchen-Gladbach school, which favoured non-confessional Christian trade unions. By I9I4 Most important of all, the Centre could not be simply a confessional party, because of the declining importance by the later nineteenth century of the confessional appeal itself: the -party's attractiveness to Catholics qua Catholics was bound to diminish as the heroic days of the Kulturkampf receded into the past. This fact was recognized by its leaders.12 With support for the tariffs of I879 and active lobbying for social reforms in the i88os, the Centre began to address itself more to the economic interests of its electorate. The founding of 9 Hiisgen, Windthorst, p. 95. 10 Kreuzzeittng, 3I Dec. I906 a plethora of artisan and peasant associations, and of the Volksverein fur das katl2olische Deutschland shortly before Windthorst's death, not only gave the party an organizational backbone, but were signs of its de-clericalization; and this concentration on social policy was reinforced from the early I89os under a new generation of leaders.13 Nor did this involve a complete break with the past, for the problems of the Catholic minority had never been exclusively religious, even in areas like the Rhineland and Baden where the attack on the Church was particularly fierce. Resentment against the Protestant ascendancy, or the ascendancy of liberal bureaucrats, had an economic and social, as well as confessional, dimension. German Catholics ringed the Protestant heartland of the Reich, their sense of separateness encouraged by their relative economic backwardness as well as by attacks on their clergy.'4 As the specifically religious component of this Celtic fringe identity lost some of its immediacy, more general grievances came to the fore and found expression through the Centre.
What requires explanation is why this growing emphasis on social policy, accompanied as it was from the I89os by declining aristocratic influence within the Centre, should have led the party to a pro-Conservative orientation rather than to alliance with the Left. The apparent paradox in this alignment of the Centre can be most effectively explained by an examination of the party's nature and origins in one of the states where it enjoyed a strong local power-base, Wiirttemberg. II Wiirttemberg had a special reputation among German states for its advanced constitutional and political arrangements. It was noted before the nineteenth century for the checks which existed there on the exercise of absolute state power, for its decentralized administration and for a strong tradition of local self-government."5 At the end of the eighteenth century Charles James Fox 13 By the middle of the I89os the founders and Kulturkampi generation within the Centre had mostly died: Mallinckrodt in I874, Savigny in I875, Franckenstein in I890, Windthorst in I89I, Peter Reichensperger in I892, Schorlemer and August Reichensperger in I895 considered it the only European state outside England with a constitution worthy of the name.16 Large territorial gains during the Napoleonic period period required a growing administrative centralization, and in many respects Wiirttemberg in the nineteenth century was a formally half-absolute state, where the constitutional centre of gravity lay with the king and his ministers, not parliament, and official influence continued to be used at elections up to the end of the century. But there remained constitutional featuressuch as parliamentary control of the purse-stringswhich were relatively advanced.
In practice, moreover, Karl I (I864-9I) and Wilhelm II (I89I-I9I8) proved more enlightened than their royal contemporaries: they left the running of politics to their ministers, even when reforms were being planned, allowing the latter to build up close working relations with certain political leaders in parliament."
Wiirttemberg has a number of advantages for a case-study of the Centre party. It was representative of those south and west German areas which were chiefly identified with the change in the nature of the Centre party in the later nineteenth century which we have already noted: a shift away from a residual clerical bias, away from aristocratic leadership and towards a greater concern with social issues. It was precisely the kind of state where closer co-operation between Centre and Left might have been expected. In addition, the Wiirttemberg Centre party possessed in Adolph Gr6ber 18 a powerful local leader who was also one of the most prominent members of the leadership group in Berlin, and representative of the new departure of the I89os. His relationship with the Catholic hierarchy in the state mirrored those of Windthorst and Lieber with Rome. Moreover, the Catholics in Wiirttemberg, as in the Reich as a whole, constituted a minority of one-third, living in clearly delimited areas in a state where religious boundaries were sharply drawn.19
The most important of these areas was Oberschwaben, acquired in stages from the Habsburgs, Bavaria and Baden at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and corresponding to that part of the administrative division of the Donaukreis which lay south of the Danube. The two other large pockets of The social separateness of these Catholic communities was crucial in determining their eventual political development in Wiirttemberg, for the timing oif the Centre's appearance in the state suggests that neither traditional grossdeutsclh sentiment, nor the level of antiJCatholic feeling, is adequate as an explanation of the party's emergence.
The Centre was not formed at state level in Wiirttemberg until I894, and it is the lateness of its emergence which makes it difficult to explain the party's origins in terms of the anti-Prussian feeling which was evident in areas like the Rhineland. Catholic Wiirttemberg was overwhelmingly grossdeutsch in i848, but so was Protestant feeling. This was perhaps the strongest common bond in the state: all 103 petitions received at Frankfurt from Wiirttemberg called for an Austrian emperor for Germany, and the anti-governmental, anti-Prussian liberals who made up the bulk of the state's representation at the Paulskirche reflected the views of both confessions.21 Nor did the events of the i86os and I870s, -although they led to the creation of a strong local National Liberal party, deprive Catholics of a vehicle for expressing grossdeutsch feeling. The anti-Prussian strain of liberalism survived more powerfully in Wiirttemberg than elsewhere, producing in the Volkspartei a specifically Swabian form of a Progressive party. Catholics therefore 'had no need to create a party which was anti-Prussiaan and particularist; and the potential leaders of such a party were content to remain within the liberal fold. The most prominent Catholic politician of the years between I850 and I890 was Rudolph Probst,2' a leader of the These differences were decisive in the years of agricultural crisis during the I840s, for the heaviest burden of debt and the highest incidence of bankruptcy fell on those areas where dwarf holdings predominated. The Donaukreis contributed only I5 per cent of the total of forced sales affecting landholders,37 and one particularly hard-hit group, the vintners, were hardly represented in the south-east Catholic region of the state, where wine was produced only in a small area around Tettnang.38 Here the worst affected group was that of the traditional landless village lower class, the Soldner and K6Ibler: in the 1840s and I85os the Catholic farm owners had the fear of sharing their fate, but not yet the experience of it. By contrast, the choice facing the densely settled Protestant peasantry was stark: to subdivide further (frequently a physical impossibility), or to leave the land for the town or overseas. The rural artisans faced a similar dilemma, ruined both by peasant poverty and competition from the factory. The flight from the land and the traditional crafts was thus largely a Protestant phenomenon, and the effect of the agricultural crisis of mid-century was to create two distinct economic units within Wiirttemberg: one industrializing fast and mainly Protestant, the other agricultural and largely Catholic.
The three nmain foci of industrialization were all Protestant. First was the Greater Stuttgart conurbation, formed as the city gradually drew the surrounding communities of ;Cannstatt, Feuerbach, Untertiirkheim, Wangen, Gaisburg and Degerloch within its industrial and commercial orbit. Stuttgart's population increased from 48,000 in i834 to 63,000 in I852, doubled in the next twenty years and reached 172,000 by the turn of the century.3" Cannstatt grew fron 7,ooo in mid-century to 20,000 in I890; from the exclusive spa town which Balzac had known it became a solidly working-class suburb of Stuttgart and a major railway junction and repair centre.40 The second area was made up by a group of towns in the Neckar valley, Reutlingen, Esslingen and Heilbronn, which were closely linked to Stuttgart, and like the capital city had grown enormously by soaking up labour from the land. The third group consisted of four towns, three in the extreme north of the Donaukreis (Geislingen, G5ppingen, Ulm), and one in the Jagstkreis (Heidenheim); but both geographically and economically, these towns looked west -towards Stuttgart and the Neckar, rather than south or east to the isolated Catholic valleys.
Catholics took almost no part in this movement into the towns and factories. In the i86os, after the first great wave of internal migration, still none of the six towns over io,ooo was Catholic; only one of the ten between 5,ooo and IO,ooo; and only three of the twenty-four between 3,ooo and s,ooo. Catholics as that part of the state had been best placed to profit from the confidence of the better years.53
Catholic peasants who had escaped the indebtedness of earlier crises now found themselves thrown on the capital market at a time when credit terms were unprecedentedly bad. In the first half of the century capital had flowed mainly into the land, but successive crises had destroyed the confidence of creditors in the peasantry. Interest rates rose " and capital turned to safer investments in state railways, or to industry and commerce where returns were higher. It was complained that money was no longer loaned against a simple promissory note (Schuldschein) but only on mortgage (Pfandschein); by I897 three-quarters of the debt owed by agriculture was in the form of mortgages. In the Donaukreis the total value of mortgage debts taken on increased by 42 per cent between I874 and I894: harsh credit terms were being tied to the security of property which was losing both its profitability and its market value.55
The first of two government inquiries into the state of agriculture found that the average number of bankruptcies in the four Kreise per io,ooo owners was 37.25. Strikingly, the western, Protestant areas which had been worst affected earlier in the century now escaped more lightly: the figure for the Neckarkreis was 3I per io,ooo, and for the Schwarzwaldkreis 23. The less densely populated part of Wiirttemberg, with its larger holdings, was now the centre of the crisis: the figures for the Jagstkreis and Donaukreis were 52 and 42 per io,ooo. The Catholic areas were the worst-suffering, and now paid the price for earlier success in resisting debt, foreclosure and flight from the land. This was especially so in the Catholic heartland of Oberschwaben, where Wangen, with 7I bankruptcies per IO,ooo, was one of the most badly affected communities, and Saulgau (58), Ehingen and Leutkirch (47) and Rieidlingen and Tettnang (46) were all well above the state average.56
Distress was strongly felt among the Catholic peasantry, for agriculture was at the very centre of life. Rottenburg's newspaper, for example, called itself the Hopfenzeitung, after the crop on which the livelihood of most of its readers depended. This same paper was once obliged to remind its readers that ' a newspaper is, so to speak, more than just the Borsenblatt of the peasant '.5 53 Over the three periods I880-84, I885-9 and i89o-94, the fall in land values was actually levelling off in the state as a whole; in the Donaukreis the loss of saleable value was still increasing, from 9-7 per cent in I880-84 to I2-3 per cent in I890-94. WJbb, II (I895), 2I. Adolph Gr6ber, beginning his legal career in Catholic Neresheim, noted with some impatience -that the local peasantry was 'interested in nothing but agriculture '.58 In the late i88os this interest quickened, as a series of factors outside their controlchanging world trade, the development of railways and canals, the po'wer of Produktenb&rse to fix prices at the expense of the local Schirannen, the labour shortage, the vagaries of the capital marketmade primary producers aware of their impotence. At the same time, there was a slackening of that solicitude which governments had always shown towards agriculture. Before the i86os, most ministers and officials had echoed the warnings of the writer in the Wiirttembergische lalrbiicher of I839 on the social dangers to be expected from industrialization 59; and backed their beliefs with a steady flow of aid and credit to the countryside. But by the last two decades of the century, industry and commerce provided the sta'te with most of its revenue, and government and officials were more concerned with ameliorating the problems caused by industrialization than with preaching the social worth of the Agrarstaat. The changing official mind was indicated by the development of insurance schemes with their chief benefit to the factory worker, and by a new concern with industrial training programmes. An equally telling sign was the emergence of a new kind of official, like the pioneering Wiirttemberg statistician Losch,6" whose interests lay in urban housing conditions and suburban railway services. The Progressives sought to counter the unpopularity of this stance by persuading the peasantry that tariffs were a Junker device; but without success, although many of their arguments were undoubtedly correct. They were right to point out, for example, that large estates were the main beneficiaries of high grain tariffs. It was also misleading to claim, as agrarian spokesmen did, that the influx of foreign agricultural produce into Germany would shortly cease, and that tariffs were simply a temporary necessity: Russia was committed to exporting grain at whatever cost, while the amount of virgin land still available in Argentina, Canada and Australia made it likely that all would continue to increase their exports to Germany.62 In Wiirttemberg it was chimerical to expect a long-term solution to the crisis of foreign competition, for there was no escaping the main problem: after the i88os the state could no longer provide its growing urban population with food, and the bakers anyway preferred foreign grain, once it became available, because of its superior quality.63 The duties on rye and wheat were also of little use in areas like Oberschwaben, where they were rarely grown.64 In fact the duties harmed large and medium-sized farms in three distinct ways. First, Prussian grain growers, having priced themselves out of world markets, dumped in southern Germany and so further deflated prices.
When the government did investigate agricultural distress, rural disenchantment was plain. It was reported from Ravensburg and Waldsee that the state fiscal burdens were felt as ' oppressive ', while the district of Thaldorf commented that its results ' are not of the kind which would win the rural population for social legislation'.61 Resentment against the olympian detachment of a distant government played an important role in the elections of the period. But it was not the traditionally anti-governmental Volkspartei which henceforth reaped the reward; and it failed because, unlike its political cousins in France, the Radicals, it lost the support of the peasantry and lower middle class in the small towns and villages. French liberalism consolidated its hold among these groups by pressing parish-pump demands in Paris: never losing a basic belief in the peasant state as a guarantee of social stability, it abhorred rapid industrial growth, and encouraged the safe investment of capital in government bonds rather than in speculative industrial ventures. The agrarian order was under-

Secondly, the repercussions of the protectionist barrier harmed the flourishing export of oats to Switzerland. Finally, the one-sided protection of grain worked against the cattle-raiser's interests: it limited his domestic market by keeping the proportion of family budgets spent on bread very high; and it made feedstuffs more expensive.`
This was the case put by Volkspartei small producers were subsistence-based, with a minimal interest in the market.66 In fact, this was not the case, and the extent of small-scale production for the market is clear from official sources. In Gmiind the marketable surplus in I870 from the I30 households of Iggingen was 1,500 bushels of spelt, I30 of barley and 40 of rye. In Degerfeld, also in Gmiind and consisting of 55 households, it was reported that ' 200-300 bushels of spelt and 250-350 bushels of oats in excess of domestic consumption can annually be sold o-utside '.Y In G6ggingen the pattern was similar, and prevailed, according to the Gmn nder Tagblatt, beyond the turn of the century.68 In reply to an inquiry of I895, the district of Bergatreute in Waldsee (where all three main grains were cultivated) calculated the annual loss to its producers from the price drop at 32,000 M: only I7 out of 23I households needed to purchase all their flour and bread; 65 produced at least part of their requirements; 48 were self-sufficient; and ioi had a surplus to market.69 There can be no question that the peasant producer had an interest in the market price of grain.
It was, of course, true that German agricultural production was unbalanced, and that a greater emphasis on cattle and dairy farming was called for to redress the over-production of grain. This, however, did not dispel the problem that the small producer's budget was often finely balanced to include a small profit from spelt, oats or barley. Nor did Progressive and liberal arguments take sufficient account of the fact that rising costs contributed at least as much as falling prices to rural anger. Thus the suggestion that he switch from grain was met with outright suspicion by the small producer, particularly since it came from the champions of that rapid industrialization which he held responsible for his plight. This reaction found support among cattle-raisers who feared a glut from over-production or a sudden flood of livestock and meat imports,70 and among dairy farmers whose apprehensions were reinforced by concern over surrogate foodstuffs. Margarine was the main enemy here: the Ravensburg Chamber of Commerce, always sensitive to the moods of local customers, reported in i894 that dairy men were fighting fiercely to check the spread of margarine as a butter substitute. Feelings were sufficiently strong for the Chamber to take up the movement, and proposeas the Centre party in the Reichstag had donethat, as a disincentive to the consumer, the offending substance be statutorily dyed a distinctive and disagreeable colour (their suggestion was violet).7" Hop growers, concentrated in the Catholic areas of Tettnang and Rottenburg, were also threatened with a curtailed outlet for their crops when improvements in refrigeration reduced the role of hops as a preservative and freed breweries from the compulsion to buy immediately after the harvest.72
All these considerations made it difficult for the Progressives to impress with their argument that peasant prosperity lay in diversification. Yet, as working-class complaints about dear food became more insistent, the Volkspartei was strengthened in its belief that the great Junker estates must be made to suffer and the peasant to see sense. As the gap between town and country widened, the peasantry looked to other parties for a sympathetic hearing, and in the early I89os matters came to a head. Grain prices dipped disastrously,"3 and cattle-raisers were struck by a series of natural disasters, culminating in a feedstuffs shortage which reduced stocks by a fifth and cost the peasantry an Family based breweries found themselves in the same dilemma. Many of those forced out of the producing sector fled to shopkeeping and inkeeping, but it was only in the cities that sufficient custom was growing, and in smaller towns these occupations were chronically overcrowded. By the i88os there were over 20,000 tradesmen's businesses in the state, and the situation was deteriorating.8' In the Catholic areas south of the Danube, artisans were encouraged by the presence of a growing number of holiday-makers from the towns to sink their reserves in a shop or inn; but the rate of bankruptcy was high in these trades, in the i88os six times as great among innkeepers and publicans as in the building industry, for example.82
If artisans and shopkeepers often proved to be their own worst enemies, they naturally found others to blame for their problems: large firms, with their control over raw materials and economies of scale; the department stores, which enticed labour and customers out of the small towns and encroached on local markets; and the men who framed the liberal commercial code, which encouraged numerous practices harmful to the Mittelstand, from price-cutting wars and the spread of automatic vending machines, to the rising sales of bottled beer so anathematized by publicans. A changing Volkspartei was as unsympathetic to these complaints as to those of the peasantry. Thirty years before, 77 cause to be sanguine: before the I895 election ministers already had plans drawn up for the modernization of the constitution, tax structure and educational system, and the liberal state bureaucracy seemed amenable to reform.87
The threat from the Volkspartei brought together the aspirations of the struggling Catholic communities and the apprehensions of their potenti.al leaders. Prominent Catholics viewed with distaste the;prospect of future political leadership by such self-consciously Cobdenite liberals: it could only accelerate the division of society into the wealthy, capitalist few, and the rootless, property-less many. Like many Cen.tre leaders in other parts of the Reich their object was to retain a society frozen in its comfortable standisch mould, and they hoped to achieve this by building up the Mittelstand of moderate property-owners into a conservative bulwark against the excesses of liberal individualism on the one hand, and the growing threat of socialist collectivization on the other.88 This concern made the future leaders of the Wiirttemberg Centre party as sensitive as their supporters to the details of government policy. Decisions on the distribution of the fiscal burden, or on canal and railway construction, were scrutinized for their effect on the fate of the Mittelstand; believing that they were engaged in a struggle to define the character of the state for a generation to come, they were able to turn apparently neutral questionslike a change in postal chargesinto fierce ideological battles.
The shared apprehensions of supporters and leaders were most evident in I895 on the issue of education. The burden of taxation was already a sensitive issue in rural areas, and educational reform would entail either new expenditure for indebted Gemeinde, or the removal of control along with the financial burden from the local community. The general education encouraged by government and liberals alike was also widely condemned: subjects like foreign languages were thought to raise children's expectations, and incite them to desert practical pursuits on the farm or in the workshop in favour of a white-collar job in the town. An unwelcome sign of social mobility had alrealdy antagonized artisans, whose apprentices were being attracted to skilled and well-paid factory jobs after enrolling in government-sponsored courses in technical education.89 The proposal to raise the school-leaving age by a year focused a number of objections: it would stretch local financial resources, and strike hard at the Mittelstand and peasantry by diminishing the supply of family labour on which they increasingly depended.90 87 89 Complaints of this kind filled the local Centre press. One of the objects of the 1897 guild legislation in the Reich was to return more control over apprentices to the master.
Relations between liberals and government were by no means smooth in these years, but a combination of Payer's conciliatory gifts, and the flexibility of Prime Minister von Mittnacht and ministers like von Pischek, enabled a degree of co-operation between politicians and government unique in Wilhelmine
90 An inquiry of I904 showed that out of 300,000 children of school age, 70,000 worked in For the Catholic elite, education had always been regarded as a major battlefield against the Enlightenment; industrial development and the rise of modern class society sharpened its significance. The political education of the working class by the SPD was an alarming state of affairs. Even more serious was the willingness of the state to assume control over education in urban areas, where pressure of numbers had exposed the inadequacy of clerical resources. More than just clerical control was at stake here. The spread of public educational provision weakened the rights of the Familienvater over his children, and gave tacit official approval to full-blooded industrialization, under which husband and wife entrusted their offspring to the state and went off to the factory. The proliferation of state schools and training colleges for teachers, together with rising teachers' salaries, brought a further problem: it promoted conflict between Catho,lic teachers, who now tended to see 'themselves more as members of a professional corps, and a clerical control over education which seemed to block their avenues to promotion.9' To Catholic leaders this was a graphic illustration of that' war of all against all' which liberalism provoked, and which a major instalment of reform would exacerbate.
Liberals, then, were encouraging a social and intellectual ferment from which only the SPD could ultimately benefit. This was the argument which convinced future Centre party leaders. The lapse of Bismarck's anti-socialist law at the end of i89o, and the continued absence of the teaching orders in Wiirttemberg could only harden this feeling, and the example olf Probst's conduct in these years is an illuminating one. In January I889 Gr6ber was still recording doubts in his diary as to whether Probst, as Wuirttemberg's leading Catholic politician, would ever be willing to lead a Centre party in the state.92 His volte-face dated from the fo,llowing year, when the SPD was freed from Bisrmarck's laws, and the party at its Halle conference singled out the Centre as its particular enemy. Less than a month later Probst was in the chair at a meeting in Ulm, helping to set up a committee to put pressure on the government over the return of the banned orders and safeguards for confessional schools.93 The meetings with ministers and the mass petition organized by Probst and the Ulm co,mmittee put forward one central proposition: in their schools policy, the liberals were 'going lhand in hand with the Social Democrats and Anarchists '.` It was this which drove some form of paid agricultural employment, nearly half as domestic servants. When this is added to the number working unpaid, the universal pattern in Oberschwaben, it can be seen how powerful an interest the larger peasant proprietor had in restricting educational expansion. 91 A meeting of the Catholic Teachers Association at Ravensburg, in I9OI, was to pass a set of ' Theses ' deploring the frustrations which attended the efforts of its members to rise in the profession. Politische Zeitfragen, 9, p. I44. Eight years later a Jagsttreis local meeting of the same body was so incensed by the ' clerical block ' that it voted full support to the Volksparetei educational spokesman, Lochnerwho was a freemason. Detitsches Volksblatt, 9 Jan. I909. 92 Cardauns, Adolph Grober, p. 65. 93 It could plausibly claim that the liberals were the main threat to peasant lands and livelihoods. But nmore important -than this, the Church in France gained a political foothold among the peasantry and artisans through the organizations of parish priests at the local level; whereas Ralliement, backed by the hierarchy as a national political movement, 'was a failure. In Germany, the politicians of the Centre party never allowed the hierarchy either to obstruct or to lead their movement. Forging a political weapon which relied heavily from the outset on the local clergy, they proved infinitely more successful than de Mun or Lamy. In Probst's case, the roots of his independence from the hierarchy were as venerable as -his liberalism: he was, and remained, a disciple of Montalembert. Gr6ber represented the new school of Centre politicians which emergeid in the I89os. He, like his mentor Windthorst, saw both the dangers and weaknesses of a political party run by Rome or the German bishops. From the i88os, when his political activity in Rottweil brought a clash with the local seminary head, he refused to be deflected by the clerical displeasure he provoked.96 His relations with successive incumbents at Rottenburg were especially cool. They preferred the discreet lobbying of ministers on specific concessions to the Church, not the instigation of a mass party which cut across the lines of their own authority.97 But Gr6ber, unwilling to see political Catholicism in Germany become the preserve of a rump: of notables and bishops, followed the course laid down by Windthorst, and followed by his own contemporaries Lieber, Spahn and Trimborn. Through the ballot box and by means of an active social policy he intended to consolidate a party aimed ideologically at liberals and socialists, conservative in its aims but entirely modern in its methods.
This was the significance of the Volksverein fur das katlholisclhe Deutsclhland, founded in Wiirttemberg four years before the party itself, and by I895 already 95 numbering 20,000 members.98 Windthorst's creation, :the Volkesverein, was intended to counter the outmoded policy and informal organization which the Centre had inherited from the Kulturkampf era, and to impose the Sozialpolitik objectives of the national party leadership on the regional idiosyncrasies and cleric.al bias of some south German Catholic movements. 99 The organization was an invaluable auxiliary of the Centre: in states where the peasantry and rural Mittelstand were suspicious of privilege and ' outside' authority, it served the same function as the peasant and artisan associations in successfully utilizing the energies of the radical lower clergy, who themselves sprang largely from similar social backgrounds. It was therefore appropriate that the founding meeting of the Centre in Wiirttemberg should have taken place at a Volksverein meeting in Ellwangen on Whitsunday I894, when the 4,000 present passed Gr6ber's resolution to form a political party to fight the coming Landtag elections. 100 The I895 elections marked a turning-point in Wiirttemberg politics. The parliament which was dissolved in the previous year was little different in composition from its predecessors in past decades, divided still into an ' anti-governmental' Left and a 'pro-governmental' Landespartei. But these groupings reflected the political alignments of i866-7i, or even I848, not those of I895. As the election showed, the economic and social forces at work in later nineteenth-century Wiirttemberg were too powerful to be contained within such an archaic party structure. The divisions between classes, between town and country, Agrarians and Industrializers, demanded, and found, direct political expression. The Centre was only one of the parties which first enjoyed an independent political existen.ce in the I895 Landtag: both SPD and Bauernbund entered the Lower House for the first time, and in a sense this was true of the Volkspartei itself, now freed from uneasy coalition with the other groups inside the Left.
The weakness of the Volkspartei was that it still claimed to represent the kleinbirgerlich radicalism of I848, although both this and its own policies had entirely changed by the I89os. Increasingly its economic policies could only be agreeable to thoselike Daimler, Bosch, Junghans, Siglewho had succeeded in raising themselves out of the Mittelstand: those who had dropped into the dependent working class looked towards the SPD, while those who struggled to maintain their independent existence on the farm or in the workshop were more likely to turn to the Centre and Bauernbund. The i895 election was therefore the beginning of a succession struggle over the liberal Volkspartei; and in the campaign economic and social issues were placed in the forefront by the supporters and leaders of the other three parties.
The Centre campaign retained the emphasis given to it by the first resolution passed at the Ellwangen meeting, attacking the laissez-faire views of the liberals and demanding legislation in defence of the peasantry and Mittelstand. This was partly a useful lightning-rod against Volkspartei attacks on the ' clerical ' Centre; but it also reflected a real demand from below, and one which the liberals clearly found embarrassing.10' Certainly in small-town meetings, pressing material problems often relegateid the lofty concerns of the Centre leadership to an entirely subsidiary role. At a meeting in the Rottweil constituency, the schoolteacher Dietz ' spoke principally about agriculture and economic questions in the light of the Centre programme, and at the close touched briefly on the schools and orders question '102 This ordering of priorities could be read in countless reports of local papers like the Ipf-Zeituing or Waldse'er Wolchenblatt. 'Defence oif the Church ' slogans played a surprisingly muted part in the campaign, given the genuine grievances of the Catholics as Catholics, the strongly anti-Catholic tenor of the opposition campaign and the importance of the local clergy in the electoral machine. VI In 1895 the Centre returned with i8 seats,'0' the Bauernbund with 5 and SPD with 2; the Volkspartei still returned 3i deputies, the last real success it was able to enjoy appealing to the electorate as the historic party of Swabian lower middle-class radicalism. But by I9I2 these strengths had been entirely altered: in an enlarged Lower House, Centre and Conservatives, as a Right block, held 46 seats, the Volkspartei only 23 and the SPD 17. This final destruction of the liberal position, from the I89os, was the decisive end of ' old polhtics' in the state, under which the Volkspartei was the natural outlet for kleinbfirgerlich dissatisfaction with the established order. It was the culmination of more than forty years of social differentiation among the electorate. The liberals were now the party of the entrepreneurs and bankers, of the growing professional groups like teachers and of the ',new Mittelstand' of white-collar workers.104 Its 101 At an electoral meeting in the Oehringen constituency, for example, Friedrich Haussmann told his audience that he was in favour of retaining duties on agricultural products at the Caprivi level. This was in flat contradiction to official party policy; Oehringen was nevertheless lost to the Bauern7bumd. On this, and the result at Crailsheim, where the Agrarians polled over 40 per cent of the vote at the first attempt, see Simon, Die wfirtten2bergischen Demookraten, p. 42. The two seats were identical in social structure and type of agriculture practised to Centre seats in the same area, like Neresheim and Ellwangen. 102 Deutsches Volksblatt, I7 Jan. 1895. 103 A note on the margin of Centre party victories may be useful here. The electoral system allowed for two ballots, with a run-off between the top two candidates if no one candidate obtained an overall majority on the first ballot. Forty-four of the 7O elected seats to tlhe Lower House were decided on the first ballot; I6 out of I8 Centre seats were won without a run-off. In the Oberschwaben seats the margin of first ballot wins was usually overwhelming: in Ehingen, the Centre deputy leader, Hans Kiene, polled 3,44I votes out of 3,5II cast. These results were achieved on an average turn-out throughout the state of 75 per cent, compared with only 44 per cent in I889, when genuine party competition was much less. 104 Simon, Die wiirtten7bergischen Demokraten, pp. 28-9. residual strength in rural areas rested partly on the comparative prosperity of groups like market gardeners, but also on judicious use of the anti-clerical card and a considerable amount of trimming on the tariff issue.105 In working-class seats, the SPD had swept aside the liberals, while in the outlying rural constituencies, Centre and Bauernbutid were the legatees of former Volkspartei strength among the peasantry and Mittelstaind. Wiirttemberg illustrates the role of the Centre as a political representative of these classes, appealing to a ghetto mentality which was as much social as religious in origin. While a liberal like Conrad Haussmann entertained a certain disdain for what he called the 'dark urges ' of the people, Centre politicians were adept at seizing on the most parochial complaint about bureaucratic Ihauteur, or the failure of a railway branch line project, and amplifying it as a political issue. This gave them a powerful stick with which to beat the liberals; and for all the demagogy which this mode of politics entailed, Centre leaders were right to see such concerns as symptomatic of a widespread sense of neglect among demoralized social groups. The importance of the Centre at local level lay in its ability, through party committees, reading rooms, the Volksverein, peasant associations, artisan and shopkeeper co-operatives, to return to these classes a sense of self-esteem, providing them with a closed world very si;milar in its comprehensiveness and tone to the sealed-off proletarian world of the SPD.
But the political organizations of Centre and SPD, at local and national level, ran on parallel rather than convergent lines. The divisions between the two parties corresponded to those between the mutually exclusive social classes from which they drew their support, and whose interests they upheld. For although the Centre was by reputation a party embracing all classes, it was disproportionately strong in the countryside and small towns, and the Catholic working class received from it only a fraction of the attention lavished on the peasantry and Mittelstand.106 Only two of the forty-five deputies who sat for the Centre in the Wiirttemberg Lower House between I895 and the war represented this interest, and even in the industrial Rhineland and Westphalia the ' left wing' of the party showed more enthusiasm for organizing artisans against proletarianization than for organizing the workers themselves.107 At Berlin, and in state 105 In a I900 Lower House division forced by the Centre on a motion to raise tariffs, six Volkspartei deputies voted against their own party, Conrad Haussmann made an ambiguous defence of free trade, and only Carl Betz maintained the old liberal hostility to tariffs of anly kind. In Geislingen and G6ppingen, Volkspartei local councillorsone a businessman dealing in agricultural implements -voted approval of even higher tariffs. 106 In Bavaria, where three-quarters of the total population was Catholic, Hertling could still describe the Bavarian Centre as the party of ' grain tariffs and compulsory guilds ' Hertling, Erinn7erungen, II, 54. 107 The social ideas of Franz Hitze, of the ' realist' left wing of the party, were straightforwardly corporatist: he foresaw a society organized into seven ' estates ' (Stainde), with production rigidly controlled. There would be no rootless proletariat, and every member of society would be ' conservative and happy again ' within his own self-governing Stand. This, no less than the extreme right-wing Oberd6rffer Programme of the I89os, had its centre of gravity among the parliaments where it enjoyed a pivotal position, the Centre consistently backed legislation designed to buttress the small producer against consumer pressure; and in its support for ' dear bread ' and its hostility to the consumer co-operative movement the Centre ran directly counter to SPD policy.
It was this which primarily prevented serious co-operation between the two great mass parties of Wilhelmine Germany, and drew the Centre towards alliance with the Conservatives. It was these two parties which joined forces to support the agricultural tariff, outlaw cheap food surrogates, hamper the co-operative movement and help the artisan with a re-vamped guild system. Centre and Conservative leaders shared a belief that the Mittelstand and peasantry could be forged into a political weapon against liberals and socialists. By nurturing them as a ' general class ' against the overmighty power of international capital on the one hand, and the threatening growth of international labour on the other, they could achieve in concrete form what Catholic ideologue Heinrich Pesch called a Solidarism of the middle,108 and the nationalist parties on the right termed Sclhutz der nationalen Arbeit. peasantry and Mittelstanid, not in the working class. Cf. P. Jostock, ' Der soziale Gedanke im deutschen Katholizismus', K. Hebing and M. Horst (eds.), Volk iin Glau?bent (Berlin, I933), pp.
I43-4.
